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ABSTRACT. In the years since Enron corporate social
responsibility, or ‘‘CSR,’’ has become a ubiquitous phe-
nomenon in both research and business practice. CSR is
used as an umbrella term to describe much of what is
done in terms of ethics-related activities in firms around
the globe to such an extent that some consider it a
‘‘tortured concept’’ (Godfrey and Hatch 2007, Journal of
Business Ethics 70, 87–98). Addressing this skepticism, I
argue in this article that the focus on CSR is indeed
problematic for three main reasons: (1) the term carries a
lot of historical baggage – baggage that is not necessarily
conducive to the clarity of the concept; (2) it is the object
of increasing ethical instrumentalism; and (3) given the
multiple ethical challenges that corporations face, and
given the fact that the ‘‘social’’ responsibilities of business
are but one set of corporate responsibilities, a suitable
term would have to be more inclusive and integrative. I
therefore suggests moving instead toward a sound defi-
nition of corporate integrity and aim in this article to de-
velop a working definition by fleshing out ‘‘7 Cs’’ of
integrity: commitment, conduct, content, context, con-
sistency, coherence, and continuity. I then discuss how
these 7 Cs impact our understanding of CSR or, more
broadly, corporate responsibility in general.
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Introduction
The corporate scandals in recent years have triggered a
broad discussion on the role of business in society, that
is to say, on its legitimacy, obligations and responsi-
bilities. As a result, there has been an exponential in-
crease in corporate social responsibility (CSR)
activities and reporting (for current data see e.g.,
www.corporateregister.com). Responding to their
constituencies corporations have started to present
themselves in much detail as ‘‘good corporate citi-
zens,’’ explaining why and how they care about a
sustainable future and what they do for their
employees, both at home and abroad. And while there
has long been disagreement about the proper role of
business organizations in society (Brickson, 2007),
there is arguably a heightened public awareness and
scrutiny by critical stakeholders as to how corpora-
tions run their businesses and what constitutes legiti-
mate business behavior. In fact, ‘‘CSR’’ has become a
ubiquitous phenomenon in both research and busi-
ness practice. It is used as an umbrella term to describe
much of what is happening in terms of ethics-related
activities in firms around the globe (Scherer and
Palazzo, 2007) to such an extent that some consider it a
‘‘tortured concept’’ (Godfrey and Hatch, 2007), a
label depicting everything and nothing. At the same
time, however, a body of serious academic literature
has emerged (Margolis and Walsh, 2003), exploring
new avenues of research, such as organizational
identity (Brickson, 2005, 2007), sense making pro-
cesses (Basu and Palazzo, 2008), institutional mecha-
nisms (Campbell, 2007), or the political role of the
corporation (Scherer and Palazzo, 2007) in order to
better understand the CSR phenomenon.
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The skepticism vis-a`-vis CSR as opposed to
related concepts such as business ethics, corporate
social performance, or stakeholder theory may be
due to its long and varied history and to the fact that
many scholars, in particular in Europe, perceive it as
either too narrow a concept, blurred, or even too
‘‘American,’’ for that matter. In addition, it has been
endorsed by business practice to connote responsible
behavior in increasingly instrumental ways. I will
touch on each of these reasons and present my own
reasoning why ‘‘CSR’’ might indeed become a
‘cul-de-sac’: I argue in what follows that the focus
on CSR is indeed problematic for three main rea-
sons: (1) the term carries a lot of historical baggage –
baggage that is not conducive to the clarity of the
concept; (2) it is the object of increasing ethical
instrumentalism and hypocrisy; and (3) given the
multiple ethical challenges that corporations face,
and given the fact that the ‘‘social’’ responsibilities of
business are but one set of corporate responsibilities,
a suitable term would arguably have to be more
inclusive and integrative. I therefore suggest moving
beyond the CSR label toward a sound definition of
corporate integrity. My aim is to develop a working
definition of corporate integrity by fleshing out the
‘‘7 Cs’’ of integrity: commitment, conduct, content,
context, consistency, coherence, and continuity. I
then discuss how these 7 Cs impact our under-
standing of CSR or, more broadly, corporate
responsibility, and conclude this article by reflecting
on the undivided corporate self.
From ‘‘SR to SCR’’: A short history of CSR
as we know it
The beginning of the debate on CSR is marked by a
landmark study commissioned by the Federal
Council of Churches of Christ in America, entitled
‘‘The social responsibilities of the businessman’’
(1953) and authored by Howard Bowen. Yet, 2
years earlier, in May 1951, Frank Abrams, a top
executive with Standard Oil, published a remarkable
piece of reflection on ‘‘Management’s Responsibil-
ities in Complex World’’ in the Harvard Business
Review, a title that seems even more topical today
than almost 60 years ago. Abrams urged his fellow
managers, i.e., businessmen, to think of themselves
as professionals with an explicit sense of duty not just
to shareholders, employees, and customers, but also
to the public in general: ‘‘(Modern) management
must understand that the general public – men and
women everywhere – have a very deep interest in,
and are affected by, what is going on’’ (p. 32). He
thus introduces an early stakeholder perspective.
Bowen’s study, in contrast, is concerned with
detailing the specific social responsibilities of busi-
nessmen. He argues that businessmen must assume
‘‘a large measure of responsibility if the economic
system of free enterprise is to continue and prosper’’
(1953, p. 5), appealing to enlightened self-interest.
And although Bowen addresses questions such as
‘‘What constitutes good citizenship for a business
enterprise? How does a moral enterprise behave?’’,
or, ‘‘What kinds of business decisions promote the
end of modern society and what kinds detract?’’ his
and Abrams’ early contributions focus on the
responsibilities of individuals within an enterprise or
corporation. Thus, in hindsight the beginning of
CSR is in fact marked by a discussion on individual
responsibilities of managers vis-a`-vis their constitu-
encies and society in general. Put differently, CSR
was more like ‘‘SR’’ – social responsibility – and
inextricably bound up with the responsibilities of
executives.
It was not until the 1960s, however, that acade-
mia took serious notice of the emerging interest in
CSR and the level of analysis still continues to be
focused predominantly on the individual manager,
or ‘‘businessman’’ for that matter (as there were
hardly any women in leadership positions). Davis,
e.g., refers to social responsibility as ‘‘businessmen’s
decisions and actions taken for reasons at least
partially beyond the firm’s direct economic or
technical interest’’ (1960, p. 70); and argues that ‘‘the
substance of social responsibility arises from the
concern for the ethical consequences of one’s acts as
they might affect the interests of others.’’ (1967,
p. 46). The social and political revolution of the late
1960s, in particular rising social awareness and eco-
logical concerns, triggered an intensification of the
debate throughout the 1970s. It is Milton Friedman’s
piece on CSR (1970), which first appeared in the
New York Times Magazine, that arguably had the
most sustainable impact. Friedman famously claimed
‘‘that the social responsibility of business is to
increase its profits’’ (and nothing else). He argues
that businesses and corporations have in fact no
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responsibilities (p. 51),1 in contrast to a corporate
executive (i.e., the individual). As a business person
and ‘‘an agent serving the interests of his principal’’
(p. 53) the executive has direct responsibility to the
principal (also called owner, employer, stockholder),
namely ‘‘to conduct business in accordance with
their desires, which generally will be to make as
much money as possible while conforming to the
basic rules of the society, both those embodied in
law and those embodied in ethical custom.’’ (p. 51).
Yet, as Friedman points out, the executive is
expected to comply with formal responsibilities and
act in accordance with legal and moral standards in
society. Friedman’s much cited argument also marks
a key reference for the latest resistance against ‘‘too
much’’ CSR in terms of redistribution of profits
which ‘‘are not the managers’ to give away’’ (Crook,
2005, pp. 17, 18).
But the 1970s are also marked by serious at-
tempts to define CSR more broadly. The Com-
mittee for Economic Development (1971) e.g.,
came up with a multi-level perspective: the inner
circle consisting of a corporation’s basic economic
responsibilities, the middle level of ‘‘current social
and environmental concerns’’ and the outer circle
of ‘‘emerging responsibilities’’. Moreover, CSR is
defined as ‘‘enlightened self-interest’’ (Steiner,
1971), as what goes beyond obeying the law in
terms of ‘‘what every good citizen does…’’ (Davis,
1973), that is we find references to ‘‘good corpo-
rate citizenship.’’ Eels and Walton (1974) define it
as ‘‘concerns with the needs and goals of society,’’
but we also find multiple references to the ‘‘legal
responsibility’’ of a corporation, to ‘‘being ethical,’’
doing charitable action, or ensuring legitimacy.
Finally, the 1970s are marked by an increasing
interest in the actual social performance of corpora-
tions (CSP) (Carroll, 1979; Sethi, 1975).
It was in the 1980s that the discussion on CSR
became at once more diverse and more theoretical:
scholars inquired about corporate responsibility in
more general, i.e., ethical terms and attempted to
define the moral status of the corporation. It was
asked, ‘‘Can we hold corporations morally
accountable for what they do? And if yes, does this
require treating them as moral persons?’’ After all,
our moral categories are designed by human indi-
viduals for human individuals. Therefore, can we or
should we apply these moral categories to ‘‘corpo-
rate organizations and their ‘acts’?’’ (Velasquez,
2002, p. 17) The discussion around corporate moral
agency (Donaldson, 1982; French, 1984; Velasquez,
1983) marked in some ways the emergence of busi-
ness ethics as an academic discipline. It became clear
that corporations can indeed be considered moral
agents, because they have specific intentions and
decision structures and thus the capacity to engage in
moral decision making, to control their policies,
rules, and actions and even to respond to ethical
criticism, e.g., by external stakeholders. (Donaldson,
1982; French, 1995) Consequently, at the same time
stakeholder theory was developed and put forward
(Freeman, 1984). Moreover, Europe enters the dis-
cussion – a discussion that is propelled by ‘‘dark
cases’’ like Bhopal (Union Carbide) and Exxon
Valdez; the European Business Ethics Network
EBEN is founded in 1987 and, last but not certainly
not least, this journal, the Journal of Business Ethics,
begins its influential work.
The 1990s bring further specialization and first
business ethics theories: global warming and envi-
ronmental concerns shift attention to issues of sus-
tainable development and beyond mere social toward
‘‘triple bottom line’’-performance (Elkington, 1998);
the speed and scope of market globalization lead to
increasing concerns about global business ethics
(De George, 1993; Donaldson, 1989; Maak and
Lunau, 1998). Moreover, Donaldson and Dunfee put
forward an ‘‘Integrative Social Contract Theory’’
(ISCT, 1994; 1999), Ulrich (1997/2008) an ‘‘Inte-
grative Business Ethics’’, Bowie (1998) ‘‘A Kantian
Perspective’’ on business ethics, and the late Bob
Solomon an Aristotelian, i.e., ‘‘Virtue Ethics
Perspective’’ (1993, 1999).
Frederick (1998) divided the first 50 or so years of
CSR into four phases: CSR 1 (1960s/1970s) as
‘‘doing the right thing’’; CSR 2 (1980s), according
to Frederick, is marked by more responsive corpo-
rate behavior toward social responsibilities, i.e.,
‘‘corporate social responsiveness’’; CSR 3 (1990s) is
marked by compliance and Frederick imagines that
CSR 4 (since then) will bring more focus on cos-
mological and spiritual aspects. It remains to be seen
whether or not CSR will indeed become more
holistic in nature. As it stands, it is a stretched out
construct – maybe not a ‘‘tortured’’ one, but cer-
tainly hard to pinpoint. It took Archie Carroll (1999)
e.g., almost 30 pages to revisit 50 years of CSR and
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provide an evolutionary perspective of a ‘‘defini-
tional construct.’’
Interestingly enough, throughout much of the
1980s and 1990s, we find little mention of CSR, or
new CSR theories for that matter. As sketched out
above, we witness specialization and diversification
toward other field of interests. This, however,
changed with Enron. Ever since the fallout of Enron
and the subsequent discussion as to what should be
done to prevent another Enron from happening, i.e.,
with the beginning of this millennium, CSR became
the key term and focus of attention. This perhaps,
because it appealed (and appeals) to increasingly
concerned practitioners as a handy-to-use term, free
from moralizing about the proper role of business
and free from ethical ‘‘heavy-lifting’’ which by
nature dominates the academic discourse in business
ethics; or, maybe because it was early on institu-
tionalized in fora such as ‘‘CSR Europe’’ and was a
term already in use in many firms. But, it is perhaps
also, I would argue, because it developed into
‘‘SCR’’ – strategic corporate responsibility.
By ‘‘strategic corporate responsibility’’ I wish to
connote the increasingly instrumental use of CSR as
a strategic positioning device in the post-Enron
environment. In order to succeed in an environment
of contested values (Diermeier, 2006) CSR is
‘‘used’’ for reputational gains; CSR strategy in and of
corporations is seen as a means to gain competitive
advantage on ‘‘the market for virtue’’ (Vogel, 2006).
Not surprisingly, the number of (more or less glossy)
CSR reports has risen exponentially in recent years,2
demonstrating just how responsible corporations
behave and that they should be trusted as good cit-
izens around the world. I do not mean to imply that
what gets published in these reports is without
substance. On the contrary, there are many corpo-
rations which take the CSR challenge very seriously,
that is as a challenge to their ethical legitimacy and
try to act, and react, accordingly. Yet, the way CSR
has been transformed into ‘‘SCR’’ since the begin-
ning of the millennium leaves the door wide open
for moral hypocrisy (Bateson et al., 2006), i.e., it may
motivate corporations to appear moral (by way of
CSR) without bearing the costs (and consequences)
of actually being moral. In other words, if CSR
deteriorates to mere PR then it becomes shallow and
ultimately a useless concept – at least in ethical terms.
Practically speaking, CSR is instrumentalized to
benefit the corporation; theoretically speaking, as
‘‘instrumental theory’’ (Donaldson and Preston,
1995), it sets out to describe what will happen if a
firm uses CSR as a strategic tool. Thus, CSR as strategic
corporate responsibility ranges from risk and reputation
management (Fombrun, 1996; Jackson, 2004) and
measures to enhance client focus and benefits (Kotler
and Lee, 2005) to initiatives in which ‘‘social and
business benefits are large and distinctive’’ (Porter
and Kramer, 2006). Consequently, Burke and
Logsdon (1996, p. 496) define CSR as strategic
‘‘when it yields substantial business-related benefits
to the firm.’’ Moreover, Porter and Kramer (2006)
as leading proponents of instrumental theory argue
that ‘‘the essential test that should guide CSR is not
whether a cause is worthy but whether it presents an
opportunity to create shared value’’ (p. 84). Con-
sequently, corporations should engage in ‘‘truly
strategic CSR’’; ‘‘it’s about choosing a unique
position – doing things differently from competi-
tors…’’ (2006, p. 88). In other words, CSR is no
longer considered a social or even a moral obliga-
tion of a corporation to society at large, but a
mere market opportunity to achieve competitive
advantage.
Moving beyond CSR
To recapitulate, so far I have presented arguments to
support two main reasons why CSR may be an
increasingly ill-fitted term to connote the responsi-
bilities of corporations. One, given the long and
varied history of CSR, as laid out above, the term
does not and cannot represent more than a rather
vague ‘‘umbrella term’’ for ethics-related issues in
corporations and the connected academic disciplines:
corporate social responsibility and performance,
business ethics, corporate citizenship, stakeholder
theory, and even sustainability. As such, it is the
object of justified criticism from scholars in these
disciplines and arguably too narrow a label to be
used. If applied, it seems appropriate to connote the
social responsibilities of businesses and executives. In
this sense, early conceptualizations were more con-
cise than the current use of the term. Two, as a result
of being instrumentalized in terms of ‘‘strategic
CSR,’’ or ‘‘SCR,’’ it may develop into mere ethical
instrumentalism and thus – from an ethical point of
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view – be the object of skepticism and rejection.
Either way, ‘‘CSR’’ seems ill-fitted to serve as an
‘‘umbrella term.’’
There is a third reason still to be considered and it
ties into the diversification of what started out as
CSR into academic disciplines: business ethics,
stakeholder theory, etc. I would argue that the
emergence of these fields of interest and ultimately
disciplines in their own right is a reflection of an
increasingly complex market environment and the
challenges it entails – today more so than in the past.
Corporations are faced with social, environmental,
ethical, humanitarian, and political challenges – and
they need to define who their stakeholders are and
how to assess their claims. There is a widespread
agreement that the stakeholder framework has
proved useful in the analysis of the strategic and
normative challenges organizations face and that
good stakeholder relationships are key to organiza-
tional viability and success (Donaldson and Preston,
1995; Freeman, 1984; Post et al., 2002; Wheeler and
Sillanpa¨a, 1997). Still, there remain both theoretical
and practical challenges with respect to stakeholder
salience (Jones et al., 2007; Mitchell et al. 1997), and
to evaluate and balance conflicting claims of multiple
stakeholders. Moreover, in a global stakeholder
society moral dilemmas are almost inevitable and this
raises questions on how to solve or even reconcile
them. E.g., how can one adhere to basic moral
principles while respecting cultural differences and
different developmental standards? (De George,
1993; Donaldson, 1996). What needs to be done to
secure ‘uncompromising integrity’ (Moorthy et al.,
1998) on a global level, while leaving leeway for
discretion in matters of particular corporate values
and culture-specific decision making? In meeting
these and related moral challenges, firms have to make
sure that their actions are ethically sound, e.g., by
reconciling cross-cultural dilemmas and knowing
when different is different and when different is
simply wrong (Donaldson, 1996). Moreover, bal-
ancing different stakeholder claims, including those
of the natural environment, future generations and
less privileged groups ‘at the bottom of the pyramid’
(Prahalad, 2005) creates social, environmental, and
humanitarian challenges. While many corporations
have adopted a ‘triple bottom line’-approach
(Elkington, 1998) and have started to integrate social
and environmental considerations into their values
creation, few have yet taken on humanitarian
challenges such as poverty, hunger, or diseases.
These miseries still prevent large parts of the human
community from participating in the global econ-
omy, let alone benefiting from it. The actual chal-
lenge at hand is twofold – on the one hand to ensure
active global corporate citizenship, meeting the
political challenges inherent to the 21st century cor-
poration; on the other hand to actively engage in less
privileged regions of the world by building and
supporting human capabilities (Nussbaum and Sen,
1993) and by assisting in eradicating world poverty.
All considered, these challenges are not just
practical challenges to be faced, but also the object of
intensive academic debate and find their reflection in
particular theoretical streams and disciplines: business
ethics in general, as an established form of applied
ethics, is concerned with systematic reflection on
moral challenges in the business world; sustainability
research elaborates on the environmental challenges
businesses face; research on corporate citizenship or on
‘‘global business citizenship’’ (Wood et al., 2006) is
concerned with the role of the corporation as a
political actor (Scherer and Palazzo, 2007) and thus
the political challenges in today’s market environ-
ment; CSR research in more specific terms, that is,
in its original sense, deals with social challenges in
business; and recently emerging research on ‘‘busi-
ness as an agent of world benefit’’ (BAWB, 2006)
and ‘‘business solutions to poverty’’ (Lodge and
Wilson, 2006; Prahalad, 2005; Rangan et al., 2007)
is focusing on the humanitarian challenges and
proposing solutions as to how poverty could be
eliminated.
Given the scope and diversity of all these chal-
lenges and the richness of research domains a proper
‘‘umbrella term’’ would certainly need to be more
inclusive, integrative and holistic than the CSR
label. Obviously, CSR is but one important domain
among multiple domains of interest and relevance.
Yet, given that these domains are connected to each
other, that all of them deal with ethical challenges in
business, broadly defined, that in fact meeting these
challenges requires some kind of integration work,
we suggest using corporate integrity as an umbrella
term instead. Still, since there are ‘‘many faces of
integrity’’ as Audi and Murphy (2006) argue, and
since both integrity and corporate integrity are far
from being well defined, we need to establish a more
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profound conceptual basis in order to support our
choice of terms. I will do so by clarifying, firstly, the
meaning of integrity and thus the different ‘‘faces’’
and levels of integrity, and secondly, by fleshing out
in more detail the 7 Cs of corporate integrity.
Integrity
According to Webster’s New World Dictionary
integrity means ‘‘the quality or state of being
complete; unbroken condition; wholeness; en-
tirety,’’ and ‘‘the quality or state of being of sound
moral principle; uprightness, honesty, and sincerity.’’
Indeed, both meanings correspond with our com-
mon perception and understanding of the term. The
first thought that comes to our mind usually relates
to a person of integrity: someone has integrity if she
acts in accordance with important moral principles,
does so in a coherent and consistent way, over time,
i.e., on an ongoing basis, especially when the going
gets rough. ‘‘Integrity involves fidelity to one’s
endorsements’’ (Calhoun, 1995, p. 244), all impor-
tant endorsements, i.e., or it would not be integrity
– an unbroken commitment to uphold a recogniz-
able set of moral principles (McFall, 1987, p. 15).
What is obvious from this meaning of integrity – as
moral integrity – is that wholeness, entirety, an
unbroken condition are part of it. Thus, the idea of
wholeness, of being complete, is an essential ingre-
dient of moral integrity.
The notion of integrity, then, implies a state of
being ‘‘undivided’’, an integral whole in the basic
sense ‘‘of being of sound moral principle.’’ In order
to achieve this state, however, certain requirements
have to be met: First, ‘‘being of sound moral prin-
ciples’’ obviously requires a commitment to some
desirable moral principles such as honesty, respect, or
sincerity. Yet, these principles cannot be just some
principles – principles which I value highly, e.g., but
need to be the right principles (Calhoun, 1995,
p. 248), or they would not be desirable or recog-
nizable by others. And, ‘‘we expect persons
of integrity not only to stand up for their most
deeply held and highly endorsed commitments, but
to treat all of their endorsements as ones worthy of
being held by a reflective agent’’ (ibid, p. 245).
Remember, ‘‘wholeness’’ and ‘‘being undivided’’
are essential for the achievement of integrity. Thus,
the element of commitment alone is already full of
requirements: persons of integrity need to commit
themselves to the right moral principles. This com-
mitment is not just some internal state but is eval-
uated by others; i.e., integrity is ascribed and
therefore, despite being a unique individual state, a
relational phenomenon. Moreover, commitment
implies that a ‘‘person of integrity is willing to bear
the consequences of her convictions, even when this
is difficult, that is, when the consequences are
unpleasant’’ (McFall, 1987, p. 9). In other words, if
upholding moral principles gets tough, if it demands
concessions or gets costly, it is still required that I act
in compliance with these principles, given that act-
ing morally can reasonably be expected of me.
Integrity, ‘‘standing for something’’ (Calhoun,
1995), implies unconditional commitment (McFall,
1987, p. 11) to do the right thing and to do things
right; whether it suits me or not, or whether it pays
or not, is irrelevant.
Second, and with respect to doing the right thing,
integrity requires responsible action or, in other
words, moral conduct in line with my integrity
requirements; e.g., by acting in a socially and envi-
ronmentally responsible manner, by fulfilling my
political obligations, and so on. Thus, thirdly, it is
not only important that I act responsibly, but also
what I do in terms of content-related requirements is
equally relevant. Fourth, given that integrity is a
relational phenomenon, it is not only at stake in
relation to some constituencies, say to friends or
shareholders, but in relation to all stakeholders.
Integrity ascription, although predominantly hap-
pening in close(r) relationships, depends on consis-
tent integrity views of all relevant others, that is, all
those with whom I have a (more or less) regular
relationship. As Brown puts it, ‘‘for individuals to
have real integrity they must be conscious of the
relationships in which they live.’’ (2005, p. 6). And,
from an organizational point of view, we may add
that integrity ‘‘is one of the key life-sustaining prop-
erties in the relational nature of organizational exis-
tence’’ (Srivastva et al., 1988, p. 5).
Fifth, and connected to both commitment and
conduct, integrity requires consistency of words and
deeds. It demands that we adhere in consistent ways
to ethical principles by aligning what we do and
what we say (Brown, 2005, p. 5). In other words, a
person (or a corporation) is ascribed integrity only if
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others have reason enough to believe that what this
person (or corporation) does (and says) is credible
and authentic – if she does what she says and talks
openly and honestly about what she does: integrity
requires walking the talk.
Moreover, sixth, a key property of integrity is
clearly coherence of principles and action. In fact, most
definitions would probably list coherence as integ-
rity’s main feature as it connotes the state of being
‘‘undivided’’ most accurately and with respect to at
least two main directions: firstly, as mentioned al-
ready, coherence between (moral) principle and
(moral) action is of paramount importance. To give
an example: to value and respect basic human rights,
such as the right not be harmed, implies that one
does so irrespective of the conditions, be they
favorable or unfavorable, i.e., unconditionally. Let
us say, I intend to do business in a South-Asian
country that does not have democracy yet; say, for
argument’s sake, that this would require me to work
with ‘‘state-controlled’’ suppliers who have been
known in the past to have violated human rights
repeatedly; in order to ensure my integrity I would
have two basic options: one, to convince these
suppliers not to harm any of their workers anymore
and ensure their compliance; and two, to pull out of
that country. In any case, integrity requires ‘‘sticking
to one’s principles’’, moral or otherwise (McFall,
1987, p. 7), whatever business opportunity may
come along.
Secondly, coherence also implies the alignment of
internal and external coherence. Internal coherence
describes according to McFall (1987, p. 8) the way in
which one’s principles are held, how one may act
given these principles, but also how one may be
motivated in acting on them. In other words, to
guard one’s integrity requires not just doing the right
thing in line with basic moral principles to which
one has subscribed; internal coherence is only given
if the agent does so for the right reasons, i.e., with
the right intention. Thus, if I prevent human rights
violations just because NGOs watch over what I do
and because it is expected by society and serves my
reputation, if I engage in responsible behavior just
because it (currently) pays, I compromise my
integrity. This may not be obvious to others, at least
not right away; yet, it undermines my integrity
nonetheless and may lead eventually to a loss of
reputation. Call this the inner condition of integrity
or simply good character requirement. External
coherence on the other hand connotes the visible
part of behavior ensuring integrity. It comprises,
from a conceptual point of view, what others de-
mand from me in terms of getting my principles and
my action right: that I follow the right principles, do
what is worth doing, consistently and in relations to
all my constituencies, even ‘‘when the consequences
are unpleasant’’ (McFall, 1987, p. 9). In sum,
integrity or wholeness ‘‘has as much to do with one’s
coherent connections and relationships with other
people and institutions as it does with one’s relation
to oneself.’’ (Solomon, 1999, p. 39).
And finally, seventh, integrity requires continuity.
We may, e.g., applaud the whistleblower who shows
moral courage in making public what ultimately are
symptoms and outcomes of an ethically deficient
organization. The whistleblower may have tried to
stop the organization from ethical wrong-doing but
– as an isolated upright organization citizen – could
not succeed. Putting oneself on the line to guard
what is (morally) right usually takes not only a lot of
courage, but may even have unpleasant conse-
quences, such as mobbing and exclusion. Now, does
all this mean that the whistleblower is a person of
integrity? Not necessarily; he may have taken the
step in order to become a person in the spotlight.
My point is, to ascribe integrity to a person requires
that we have known this person over a certain
period of time so that we could observe if she acted
‘‘with integrity,’’ or more precisely, in line with
integrity requirements. Such continuity, in particular
when the going gets rough and the person has
mastered ‘‘integrity tests,’’ is a necessary element of
integrity.
All considered, integrity is obviously more than
just a preferable virtue among others. Audi and
Murphy (2006) have argued that integrity should be
considered an ‘‘adjunctive virtue’’ rather than a
substantive virtue in its own right. It is ‘‘adjunctive’’
in the sense that it integrates several desirable moral
qualities. While I agree with the authors that
integrity differs from virtues like, say, benevolence
or honesty, by being less concise, or ‘‘substantive’’;
‘‘adjunctive’’ seems far too weak a term to describe
integrity as laid out above. Rather, I agree with Bob
Solomon, who contends that integrity ‘‘is not in
itself so much a virtue as it is a synthesis of the
virtues’’ (1999, p. 38). Thus, to call it a ‘‘super’’ or
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‘‘master virtue,’’ aimed at ensuring unified moral
agency, moral integration and ultimately an undi-
vided moral self, reflects better what it stands for and
what is at stake. It also ties into the conclusion that
both McFall (1987) and Calhoun (1995) draw from
their in-depth inquiry into the nature of integrity.
McFall argues that integrity is in fact ‘‘a personal
virtue granted with social strings attached’’ (p. 11),
highlighting the social and ascriptive nature of
integrity; Calhoun takes her argument a step further
by stating that it is both a social trait and a social virtue
– indicating the social nature of integrity.
To summarize, all of the above conditions –
commitment, conduct, content, context, consis-
tency, coherence, and continuity – need to be met
and aligned to ensure integrity. Thus, integrity
obviously requires integration, active moral agency.
Complex as it may be, to master integrity requires
integrative efforts to ensure alignment of intention
and purpose (commitment), conduct, responsibilities
(content), relationships both distant and close (con-
text), words and deeds (consistency), principles and
action as well as internal and external conditions
(coherence), on an ongoing, life-long basis (conti-
nuity). Yet, the relational nature of integrity is such
that despite one’s continuing efforts to achieve this
state of wholeness, it remains difficult as ‘‘one’s
integrity is implicated in everything one does’’
(Calhoun, 1995, p. 242).
Toward a theory of corporate integrity
Until now, in defining the ‘‘7 Cs’’ of integrity, my
level of analysis was pre-dominantly the individual
person. However, my aim in this article is to flesh
out in more detail a working definition of corporate
integrity. This raises the question ‘‘Can we apply the
same conditions and integrity requirements to cor-
porations and individuals?’’ The answer is yes, for
the following reasons: one, as argued above, the
discussion on corporate moral agency (Donaldson,
1982; French, 1984; Velasquez, 1983) made clear
that corporations can indeed be considered moral
agents because they have specific intentions and
decision structures and thus the capacity to engage in
moral decision-making, to control their policies,
rules, and actions as well as to respond to ethical
criticism, e.g., by external stakeholders (Donaldson,
1982; French, 1995). Therefore, as Moore (1999,
p. 339) notes, the acceptance of corporate ‘‘moral
agency’’ is not only plausible but in fact is a reflec-
tion of ‘reality’. Moreover, Velasquez argues that ‘‘it
makes perfectly good sense to say that a corporate
organization has moral duties and that it is morally
responsible for its acts’’ (2002, p. 18), if only in a
secondary sense, with individual decision makers as
primary moral agents. Thus, given the widespread
agreement that there is in fact corporate moral
agency and given the complex demands of ensuring
integrity it is only logical to work out a notion of
corporate integrity. Two, the multiple ethical chal-
lenges of today’s corporation require integration, i.e.,
concerted efforts to align corporate principles and
practice, to engage stakeholders, to ensure ethically
sound issue management and certainly also to align
words and deeds. In other words, they require integ-
rity. And three, even if we took just the non-moral
sense of the word – ‘‘wholeness,’’ i.e., if we left out
the moral requirements of integrity, the term ‘‘cor-
porate integrity’’ could still be employed, at least in a
metaphorical sense.
Moreover, the term has been used occasionally in
recent years: Audi and Murphy (2006) give an
overview of the many uses of the term ‘‘integrity,’’
including references in discussions on business ethics,
although without special mention of the corporate
level. Still, they note that the term ‘‘is quite possibly
the most commonly cited morally desirable trait’’ in
the world of business; ‘‘but integrity is used in
widely differing ways…’’ (p. 3). However, in light of
these many uses they are more concerned with
defining its character as an ‘‘adjunctive virtue,’’ not
with its meaning in corporate terms. Bob Solomon
(1999) has given it, as already mentioned, a promi-
nent role as a ‘‘synthesis of the virtues.’’ Yet, his
Aristotelian business ethics approach is naturally
centered on the individual and thus more concerned
– as one book title suggests – with the question
‘‘how personal integrity leads to corporate success.’’
Srivastva et al. (1988) highlighted early on the sig-
nificance of ‘‘executive integrity,’’ as did Watson
(1991) by presenting insights from America’s CEOs.
Becker (1998) inquired into the role of integrity in
organizations in search of an ‘‘objective code of
morality’’ while Petrick and Quinn (2001) have
focused on leadership integrity as a ‘‘strategic asset.’’
Koehn (2005) shared their intuition by arguing that
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integrity in general, properly understood, could
function as a ‘‘business asset.’’ What all these sources
have in common is their more or less explicit focus
on individual integrity and its relevance in the world
of business.
The actual idea of organizational or corporate
integrity was first put forward explicitly by Paine
(1994). She contrasted the pre-dominant compliance
focus in (American) business ethics with an integrity
perspective and sketched out key features of an
‘‘integrity strategy’’ as a way of pro-active assurance
of responsible conduct, in contrast to a legally dri-
ven, reactive compliance focus. Among other sour-
ces are Thorne LeClair et al. (1998); they however
mix both by offering a ‘‘blueprint for compliance’’ as
‘‘integrity management’’. An explicit integrity
management system is at the core of Kapteins (1999,
2003) and Kaptein and Wempes (2002) contribu-
tions. Similarly, Kennedy-Glans and Schulz (2005)
provide an ‘‘integrity toolkit.’’ Yet, while all these
contributions underscore the significance of corporate
integrity, they miss out on one important element,
namely providing a sound definition of corporate
integrity that pays tribute to both the moral and the
holistic meaning of the term in light of the ethical
challenges in and around organizations. Paine has
certainly popularized the term but her focus is on
aligning ethics and strategy, not on integrity as
wholeness; and Kaptein and Wempe (2002) should
be given credit for highlighting the importance of
aligning principles and action by way of ‘‘integrity
management.’’ Yet, their first chapter is entitled
‘‘Why business ethics?’’, i.e., although integrity is a
focus of their inquiries, their main focus is on busi-
ness ethics in general and management tools in
particular (Kaptein, 1999, 2003), not on a particular
theory of corporate integrity. Thus, while these
authors have prepared the path toward integrity, I
argue here that we can follow that path properly and
successfully – and achieve true integrity (morally and
holistically) – only if we establish a sound under-
standing of corporate integrity in its own right.
Brown (2005) has come close to doing so by
suggesting that corporate integrity consists of five
dimensions: a cultural dimension in terms of open-
ness and inclusive behavior, an interpersonal
dimension depicting ‘‘relational wholeness,’’ orga-
nizational integrity ‘‘as pursuing a worthwhile pur-
pose,’’ ‘‘social integrity as civic cooperation,’’ and
ultimately natural or environmental integrity as
‘‘natural prosperity,’’ with leadership as the integra-
tive force. Thus, he emphasizes commitment
(‘‘worthwhile purpose’’), content (social and envi-
ronmental issues) and context of corporate integrity
(‘‘relational wholeness’’). However, while he
advances our understanding regarding corporate
integrity he mixes conceptual and content related
issues, i.e., loci of morality and issues of morality, and
therefore fails to provide a consistent and coherent
definition of corporate integrity.
But still, his approach illustrates that in seeking to
ensure integrity in business we are confronted with
different levels of integrity: the level of the individual
person and thus individual integrity – I refrain from
calling it ‘‘executive integrity’’ (Srivastva et al., 1988)
because it ought to include all individuals, executives
and employees alike; the level of the organization and
thus corporate integrity, but also the level of stakeholder
integrity, broadly defined as the integrity of all indi-
viduals or groups who have a legitimate interest in,
are affected by or could be affected by the activities of
both the corporation and the members of the cor-
poration (Freeman, 1984). These interacting but
different levels of integrity create a particular ‘‘chal-
lenge of wholeness’’ (Kolb, 1988, p. 70): although
these levels are not competing for their integrities,
there may be instances when individual integrity and
organizational integrity conflict with each other, e.g.,
in cases when ethical principles and profit motives
collide, up to a point when the individual’s last resort
is to blow the whistle to save her own integrity. As
for external stakeholders, this integrity tension might
occur more frequently, given that they may value
different things in life, expect the corporation to be
less profit- and more community-oriented, etc.
Moreover, in case of (doubtful) suppliers in devel-
oping countries who operate with production
methods that are harmful to their workers (as it was
the case with the sports apparel maker Nike), or use
harmful substances (as in the case of the toymaker
Mattel), supply chain integrity becomes a major chal-
lenge for the corporation in order to ensure its own
corporate integrity. Thus, there is an obvious need to
synchronize the integrities of all moral agents to the
extent that they become conducive to each other and
do not interfere with each other, e.g., by aligning
individual and corporate principles, by aligning
suppliers to one’s own integrity requirements or by
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creating common ground and purposeful partner-
ships with critical stakeholders.
Figure 1 depicts the 7 Cs of corporate integrity in
a circular way; the outer circle indicates the constant
need for integration.
Commitment
As discussed above, commitment requires that the
moral agent is committed to a ‘‘worthwhile pur-
pose’’ (Brown, 2005) and important moral princi-
ples, i.e., not some principles or the company’s own
principles, but the right principles, even when
‘‘sticking to them’’ may get unpleasant. As a basic
condition for corporate integrity this implies that the
company’s principles are aligned to the basic moral
principles of society and basic human rights more
generally. In a (global) stakeholder society the
‘‘rightness’’ of a company’s principles is ultimately
not determined by its management or shareholders
but by the critical public in general; it is determined
in public deliberation (Scherer and Palazzo, 2007).
Moreover, in the light of growing stakeholder
expectations with respect to the various responsi-
bilities of corporations beyond its core economic
purpose – social, environmental, civic, and human-
itarian – it is essential that corporations make sure
that their purpose is indeed considered worthwhile;
not just by shareholders but by all stakeholders.
Thus, with ‘‘values everywhere’’ (Diermeier, 2006,
p. 156) and growing expectations to deliver on these
values it becomes crucial for a corporation to show
and prove its commitment to a worthwhile purpose
and the ‘‘right’’ principles. The quest for corporate
integrity, then, is at least to some extent an ‘‘ethics
competition’’: corporations compete on having the
right values and principles. Not surprisingly, we
witness an exponential increase in CSR reporting.
Yet, success, i.e., ascription of integrity, also depends
on the uncompromising commitment to these basic
principles. As discussed, integrity is not ascribed for
having ‘‘sunshine ethics,’’ e.g., supporting human
rights when it does not implicate the economic
bottom line, but for sticking to one’s core principles
even when it gets ‘‘costly,’’ e.g., by pulling out of a
country where human rights violations occur or by
not going there in the first place, thereby foregoing
‘‘economic opportunities’’ but saving one’s integrity.
Conduct
As noted above, integrity requires responsible action
or, in other words, moral conduct in line with one’s
integrity requirements. It is with respect to respon-
sible conduct that ‘‘integrity management’’ or
‘‘managing with integrity’’ comes into play. To
ensure corporate integrity professional ways of
designing, steering, and controlling integrity related
matters in a corporation need to be implemented.
With respect to wholeness (i.e., by definition) this
management approach has to be holistic or it would
not be integrity management. Thus, it requires
thorough and systematic endeavors to find and close
possible loopholes – integrity gaps – that could
endanger the integrity of a corporation. Again, to
give an example related to supply chain integrity:
companies like Nike or Mattel have worked hard to
build both their images and reputation. Yet, both
have suffered considerably due to lapses in their
particular supply chains: Nike, because their incen-
tive system was not aligned with the company’s
commitment to social and human rights (Maak and
Ulrich, 2007, p. 271); Mattel because they were
apparently unable to ensure that their Chinese
suppliers do not use harmful substances such as lead-
based colors in the toy-making process. With out-
sourcing and a vastly progressing division of labor in
the global economy companies like Nike and Mattel
Continuity
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Figure 1. The 7 Cs of Corporate Integrity.
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need to ensure that they close all potential integrity
gaps. A company’s integrity is not only implicated by
everything it does, but also and more importantly by
what it does not do. Each and every integrity gap can
endanger corporate integrity as such – because it
implicates ‘‘wholeness.’’ It is therefore imperative
that a corporation makes sure, e.g., by implementing
an integrity management system (Kaptein, 1999;
Kennedy-Glans and Schulz, 2005; Paine, 1994), that
individual and corporate conduct are aligned, that it
supports pro-active action to prevent any gaps from
arising and that it has principles-based processes in
place that ensure ethically sound behavior in all
walks of corporate life.
Content
The third ‘‘C’’, content, connotes the fact that it is not
only important that a corporation (or the individuals
in that corporation) act responsibly, but also what it
does. Coming back to the aforementioned ethics
challenges, the ‘‘what’’ relates, broadly speaking, to
social, environmental, civic and humanitarian values
creation. Integrity requires both addressing these
challenges and the inherent stakeholder expectations
and fulfilling any corporate responsibilities derived
from these challenges. ‘‘Standing for something’’
(Calhoun, 1995) in social terms means living up to
the corporate social responsibilities and meeting
certain basic social expectations of stakeholders and
communities at large, e.g., by providing a safe and
decent workplace and social benefits for employees,
supporting life-work balance programs, enabling an
inclusive work environment by respecting cultural
differences, establishing kindergartens, etc.; but also
by being socially responsive to the need of commu-
nities and society at large. In terms of the natural
environment companies are arguably expected to be
part of the solution to global warming and the
environmental crisis, and not part of the problem.
Thus, sustainability in processes and practices and the
idea of environmental stewardship in principle be-
come a focal point for corporate value-creation.
Moreover, there is widespread agreement that cor-
porations have civic obligations. Whether or not
corporate citizenship is a mere metaphor or if it in
fact represents the political status of the corporation is
a different debate (see e.g., the BEQ issue 1/2008).
The fact is that corporations are part of communal life
and they contribute to communities in which they
operate and they are expected to act as ‘‘good global
citizens,’’ both at home and abroad. Lastly, as dis-
cussed in the beginning, there are growing expecta-
tions vis-a`-vis larger, multinational corporations to
assist and take on a more active role in fighting some
of the world’s most pressing public problems such as
diseases (HIV Aids, etc.), poverty, and hunger. What
we witness, then, are emerging humanitarian
responsibilities. In addition, we should not forget to
mention a corporation’s basic economic responsi-
bilities; all of which require integration work,
alignment and an active, integrity-focused issue
management. Today’s corporations are expected to
engage in multiple values-creation; and integrity
ascription depends on how they deliver on what can
reasonably be expected. Thus, it is not expected that
they transform into social organizations; however,
making profits is certainly not sufficient to ensure
one’s integrity.
Context
Context, as a basic condition for integrity, is well
defined through ‘‘relational wholeness’’ (Brown,
2005, p. v). Corporate integrity as a relational phe-
nomenon requires engaging responsibly with, and
responding to, all stakeholders. It is not only at stake
in relation to some constituencies, but in relation to
all constituencies. Therefore, just like individuals, for
corporations to have true integrity they must be
conscious of all relationships in which they partici-
pate, engage with all their constituencies in
responsible ways, meet their reasonable expectations
and be considered a partner (and not a burden) in
ensuring a sustainable future. Practically speaking,
what is required is an ethically sound stakeholder
engagement and management; one that is not driven
by instrumentalism (Jones, 1995), but takes it as a
given to engage with others (i.e., internal and
external stakeholders) irrespective of the beneficiality
of such engagement, basing their commitment on
mutual recognition and good reasons. ‘‘Relational
wholeness’’ requires sound relating as well as being
consciously embedded in one’s whole range of
relationships; internally, externally, and with socie-
ties at large (Maak and Pless, 2006b).
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Consistency
Moreover, corporate integrity requires consistency of
words and deeds. It demands that a corporation ad-
heres to ethical principles in consistent ways, in par-
ticular with respect to aligning talk and walk. Tying
into integrity commitment this implies being honest
and sincere about the corporation’s CSR achieve-
ments, but also about its failures, and not using CSR
reports as a ‘‘selling device’’ but as an instrument for
authentic representation and stakeholder dialogue. A
corporation is ascribed integrity only if stakeholders
have reason enough to believe that what the corpo-
ration did, or does, and what it says is credible and
authentic. Yet, authenticity is attributed only if both
talk and walk are aligned and if over time no credibility
gaps are detected (Maak and Ulrich, 2007, pp. 22,
122). Corporations need to be aware that window-
dressing, even in small, unintended, PR-driven
amounts, can be a serious threat to their integrity.
Again, one’s integrity is implicated by everything one
does (Calhoun, 1995, p. 242); yet, it is already on the
line, compromising all other efforts, if manipulation or
even hypocrisy come into play. It should be noted,
then, that keeping low profile is certainly a better
‘‘integrity strategy’’ than raising one’s profile without
substance (i.e., action) to support it.
Coherence
As for coherence between (moral) principles and (moral)
action, we noted earlier that this is a fundamental
integrity requirement. It is imperative that a corpo-
ration sticks to all the principles it is committed to, in
particular to the ethical principles as laid down in the
code of conduct, values or mission statement. It is
expected that these principles are aligned to those of
society, that they fulfill basic moral requirements and
promote standards of common decency. Again,
integrity requires a corporation to make sure that it
subscribes not just to some principles it considers
important, say to fairness and profit maximization, but
to the right principles. In other words, integrity
ascription depends on synchronizing, or rather bal-
ancing, of a company’s purpose and society’s princi-
ples. Moreover, it depends on coherent action, i.e.,
corporate conduct in line with the company’s prin-
ciples and thus with what it stands for.
To pick a well-known example: when James
Burke, the former CEO of the U.S. health company
Johnson & Johnson, decided to pull all Tylenol
bottles off the shelves in North America, although
cases of poisoning seemed to be restricted to the
greater Chicago area, it was not only an act of
responsible leadership (Maak and Pless, 2006a), but
in line with the company’s principles. These state
that customers, that is the health (and safety) of
customers, come first and shareholders last. Thus,
J&J was acting with integrity. Giving in to economic
considerations by restricting the recall to certain
areas, not knowing if the health of all customers
would be ensured, was simply never an option –
given the company’s focus on values and integrity.
Such coherent behavior, in particular in defining
moments, demonstrates to stakeholders that a com-
pany is serious about its commitments to certain
principles, that it goes out of its way to make sure
that people and the organization stick to these
principles and that ‘‘customer focus’’ means focusing
on customers desires and needs, not on their money.
As a consequence, trust and integrity ascription fol-
low, certainly not right away, but over the course of
time and in sustainable ways. Moreover, the Tylenol
example also illustrates both external and internal
coherence: as for external coherence, it could be
argued that Burke and J&J not only followed the
right principles, did what was worth doing, consis-
tently and in relations to their constituencies, but did
so when the consequences were unpleasant (McFall,
1987, p. 9) by way of a costly recall. And in terms of
internal coherence it should be noted that apparently
they also did it for the right reasons, i.e., with the
right intention. The rationale for the recall was not
that more cases of poisoning may have damaged the
company’s image or even reputation, or the fear of
costly lawsuits, but simply the conviction that the
health of customers come first. To conclude, it does
not suffice to do the right thing if others (i.e.,
stakeholders) take it to be happening for the wrong
reasons.
Continuity
Lastly, corporate integrity cannot be achieved by
seizing the moment. The ideal of unified moral
agency implies a more or less explicit evaluation
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process by the agent’s constituencies (i.e., stake-
holders) over time. Stakeholders need to have suf-
ficient reason to believe that the corporation and
their executives take ethics seriously. This requires
that the corporation has demonstrated an ongoing
commitment to important principles, even in tur-
bulent times; that it has consistently acted responsi-
bly and in cases of lapses acted swiftly to clarify them
and keep them from happening again; that it has
done so in recognition of all its constituencies in
good times and in bad times; that it has constantly
tried to balance its multiple responsibilities – eco-
nomic, social, environmental, civic, and humani-
tarian; and that it has never left a doubt that it has
considered living up to these responsibilities to be
simply the right thing to do.
Conclusion: Overcoming the divided
corporate self
To conclude, I believe that a detailed account of
corporate integrity as presented above advances our
understanding with respect to how corporations
should think about ‘‘CSR,’’ namely in more
holistic ways in order to capture the complex
reality of corporate responsibility, broadly defined.
In fleshing out the 7 Cs of corporate integrity, I
have demonstrated what is at stake in today’s
environment of contested values and that corporate
integrity is not just another term to be used in
CSR related or business ethics related matters. In
contrast, it can serve as a sense making framework
to further the integration of issues and levels. I
argued that given the scope of ethics challenges it
does not suffice to follow a piecemeal approach in
matters of ‘‘CSR,’’ or corporate responsibility in
more general terms. Corporate integrity may raise
the bar, but by aligning the various integrity
requirements and by integrating issues and levels,
corporations are arguably much better equipped to
meet all and not just some of the ethics challenges
and thus to act responsibly.
In regard to research, I am inclined to think that
we have much to gain by employing corporate
integrity as a sense making device. CSR, business
ethics, stakeholder theory, corporate citizenship, etc.
are all important research domains in their own
right. Yet, what is still missing is a framework that
connects these domains in plausible and workable
ways. By working toward a theory of corporate
integrity such ‘‘relational wholeness’’ may well be
achieved. Thus, although I suggested that corporate
integrity should be used as a more fitting ‘‘umbrella
term’’ for corporate responsibility research in general
and CSR in particular, it is certainly more than that,
in terms of both research and practice. As for busi-
ness practice, integrity is quite possibly the biggest
asset a corporation can have. After all, as McFall puts
it (1987, p. 20): ‘‘Without integrity, and the iden-
tity-conferring commitments it assumes, there
would be nothing to fear the loss of, not because we
are safe but because we have nothing to lose.’’
Thus, even though a focus on integrity raises the
bar even further it is arguably the only chance to
overcome an increasingly fractured corporate self.
Meeting multiple stakeholder expectations, balanc-
ing their claims and realizing value for the many, and
not just a few (managers and shareholders), requires
an explicit sense of wholeness both in matters of
relationships and in matters of content. I suggested in
this article that a more explicit focus on corporate
integrity may help in achieving this goal and ulti-
mately becoming an ‘‘undivided corporate self.’’
Notes
1 The page references refer to a widely available
reprint in Beauchamp and Bowie (2001).
2 See www.corporateregister.com for exact data.
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